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Article 5

The Emerging Storm

The Emerging Storm:
Sir Percy Loraine and Anglo-Turkish
Rapprochement, 1934-1935
Otto Kienitz
In January 1934, a gentleman from northern England
traced the historic route of St. Paul the Apostle, only this time
in the opposite direction—straight into the blinding rays of the
rising sun. The man travelled east aboard the Oriental Express,
steaming from Vienna to Istanbul, and then onward across the
Anatolian Plateau, which was flecked white by an early winter
snow. He was bound for the new Turkish capital of Ankara
in central Anatolia. The man arrived at his destination on the
morning of January 30, 1934, greeted by a damp chill that settled
between the alleyways on the steep slopes of the old town.1 This
man was Sir Percy Loraine of Kirkharle, a fifty-four year old
British ambassador who had ended his post in Egypt a year before and now was slated to take charge of the British Embassy in
Turkey. Still bitter from being assigned to the “wilds of Anatolia,” he was in a sour mood when his compatriots met him at the
railway station.2
Ambassador Loraine ascended quickly through the ranks
of the British Foreign Service, building his diplomatic acumen
as a young attaché at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and
then as a more experienced diplomat, moving from Spain, Persia, Greece, and Egypt, before packing his bags for Turkey. He
won fame as an “Orientalist” for his cordial rapport with eastern
strongmen like Reza Khan of Iran (with whom he negotiated in
Tehran as Head of Mission in the mid-1920s). Loraine noted his
affinity for working with certain despotic personalities in his diary: “I do understand them better than most people—and I know,
too, that their affection once won, is a very charming thing.”3 A
note from Loraine’s wife and the executors of the diplomat’s
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Sir Percy Loraine, GCMG PC (November 5, 1880 – May 23, 1961)
Educated at Eton College and then later at New College, Oxford, Loraine
served in the British Foreign Office for almost four decades, from 1904-1941.

will contained the following posthumous praise for the British
Ambassador from historian Sir Pierson Dixon: “[H]is conduct
of affairs was based on his belief that it is ‘men’ that count—not
machines—in the order of human affairs; his achievements, his
trials which were those of his country, and how he set about
overcoming them being the evidence as to the truth of his beliefs.”4
During his tenure in Ankara between 1934-1939, Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine was responsible for organizing a
geopolitical rapprochement between Britain and the Republic
of Turkey. This historical study weaves the tale of Sir Percy Loraine’s personal diplomacy through the overarching narrative of
European international relations. It prioritizes Britain’s imperial
and geopolitical interests in the security of the Mediterranean
Basin as well as the territorial sovereignty of the nascent Turkish Republic. The mid-1930s were characterized by an anxious
response on the part of the status quo powers threatened by
the fascist revisionism sprouting in Benito Mussolini’s Italy and
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Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Upon the backdrop of interwar
diplomatic history, this essay details Ambassador Loraine’s experience forming his first strong relationship with the Turkish
government in 1934, the challenges he confronted while working between London and Ankara during the early years of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, and the impact of the burgeoning
Anglo-Turkish relationship on the brewing storm of European
diplomatic history during 1935 and beyond.
THE BALKAN PACT AND THE ITALIAN MENACE
The signing of the defensive Balkan Pact between
Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on February 9, 1934,
was the first alarm to the British signaling the change in geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean. The coordination of the
Balkan Pact was a reaction to Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini’s exclusive Four Power Pact, proposed in 1933, in which
Italy called for great power cooperation between Berlin, London,
Paris, and Rome. The Balkan Pact was therefore designed as a
regional counterweight to Great Power politics that kept the “demands and interests of the smaller states” in mind.5 Turkey took
the lead in Balkan diplomacy to orchestrate a defensive “‘neutrality’ bloc” against the carving of the peninsula into spheres of external influence.6 Because Ankara still remained at odds with the
four Great Powers over a number of territorial disputes, Turkish
policy was “generally perceived as promoting the interests of
the regional countries and diluting great power control in the
Balkans,” as well as deterring a provocative Bulgarian collusion
with Fascist Italy that could threaten the stability of the Eastern
Mediterranean.7 The multilateral agreement offered Turkey the
support it desired to warn Bulgaria against pursuing revanchist
policies in the Balkan Peninsula, buying time for Ankara to “organize a regional defense against Italy”—the larger and more
menacing threat to the stability of the Mediterranean Basin.8
Ever since the conclusion of the Mosul Crisis in 1926,
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British attention and materiel in the region had been quietly
dwindling.9 Suddenly the Balkan Pact, and the lacuna of Bulgaria’s exclusion from the defensive club, brought the question
of Turkish security (and thus the remilitarization of the Turkish
Straits) to the fore.10 As Ambassador Loraine noted in a telegraph dated May 6, 1934, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Aras had reasoned, “If nations rearmed,
Turkey was entitled to behave as they. She would not accept different treatment.”11 Since Bulgaria was determined to rearm its
military, Dr. Aras implied that the whole trend toward rearmament required Turkey to revisit the status of the demilitarized
Turkish Straits. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir
John Simon, however, retorted that this would make “a most
unpleasant impression.”12
The French and Italian Ambassadors to Turkey were
similarly alarmed, and urged the Great Powers to stand together
against Turkish revisionism. As aforementioned, the Turks were
concerned primarily with the collusion between Italy and Bulgaria. Mussolini’s government was providing arms to the Bulgarians, and the Turkish government interpreted this development as a direct threat to the demilitarized zone in the region of
Thrace along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The resident dragoman James Morgan reported on the deliberations of the Turkish
Grand National Assembly of June 1934.13 He described Turkish
Interior Minister Sükrü Kaya’s speech in response to the threats
posed against Turkey from the Mediterranean:
In the light of events which have recently created a stir in
Turkey, such as the speeches of Signor Mussolini about
possible Italian expansion in the East; increase of Italian strength in the Dodecanese [Islands], and suspected
Italian aid to Bulgaria, it is natural to connect the sudden
decision to increase the credits for national defense with
Turkey’s distrust and dislike of Italy.14
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In front of the Turkish Parliament, Kaya, simultaneously acting
as Minister for Foreign Affairs while Dr. Aras was away tending
to affairs at the League of Nations in Geneva, referenced Mussolini’s speech from March 18 in which the Italian Premier extolled,
“Expansion in Africa and Asia is the task for future generations
of Italians.”15 The Turkish public was unnerved by the rhetoric
of the fascist government in Italy and, as Ambassador Loraine
wrote in his first Annual Report on Turkey, “It seems probable
that Turkish Italophobia is exaggerated. It is, however, real…It is
probable that mistrust of Italy impelled Turkey toward a closer
relation with the United Kingdom.”16 Loraine noticed that Italian aggression might lead Turkey to search for an ally among the
Great Powers, particularly one with a strong navy and vested interests in a peaceful Mediterranean Basin. Therefore, Mussolini’s
bellicosity—and the timidity of the Balkan Pact given the omission of Albania—opened the door for a strategic Anglo-Turkish
rapprochement. Consequently, the Ambassador moved quickly
to present Britain as a viable partner to the Turkish Republic.
No event is more telling of Turkey’s drift toward rapprochement with Britain than Ambassador Loraine’s wild evening on June 17, 1934—a night he recounted to Secretary Simon
in a long dispatch a few days later.17 After a banquet at the Ankara
Palace Hotel, the Ambassador was playing bridge with his usual
fastidiousness when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the President of
Turkey, and two Persian generals (both of whom Loraine knew
well from his mission in Tehran) entered the room and invited
the Ambassador to join their game of poker. Loraine accepted
the offer and was inundated with a game of cards that crept on
and on throughout the night, well past the morning light. He
later remarked, “During these long hours The Gazi quite obviously cast down all barriers of formality, and, without any loss
of dignity, treated me as though I were a personal friend and
comrade.”18 Atatürk was an adept gambler, but chose to mix up
the chips at the end of the game so as to resolve any diplomatic
differences. As the party left the table, Atatürk motioned for LoPenn History Review
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raine to stay behind.
The President thoughtfully engaged the Ambassador
over the night’s proceedings. Atatürk wished to know if Loraine
imagined the President’s antics as “fortuitous” or “deliberate”
and the Ambassador responded politely, “His Excellency did
not give me the impression of a man who left many things to
chance.” Atatürk smiled and acknowledged the “excellent impression” the British Ambassador already made on the Turkish
Government, as he saw Loraine’s appointment as a “measure of
the friendly intentions of His Majesty’s Government.” Loraine
later pondered, “The Gazi said he had the greatest esteem for
England and that he wished for friendship with England. Why
could we not come closer together?” The Ambassador further
mused, “It was not merely a question of the Turkey of today,
but also of the Turkey of tomorrow…[and thus there was] no
reason why England and Turkey should not be good friends.”
However, Loraine realized that the sticking point between closer
relations with Turkey was the country’s “most intimate friend…
Russia.” Aware of this apprehensive sentiment maintained by
Loraine, President Atatürk verbally reassured the British Ambassador, indicating that “Turco-Russian intimacy” was no bar to
Anglo-Turkish friendship. In response, the Ambassador replied,
“If the two friendships could coexist on open and parallel lines,
then so much the better.” President Atatürk, visibly warmed by
this exchange, reemphasized his wish for closer relations between Turkey and Britain. Moreover, before the two men parted
ways, Atatürk added “that if England really desired this on her
part, he would want us to make some unmistakable sign to that
effect.” Evidently, Atatürk’s sentiments were genuine, since the
following evening Loraine was invited once again to The Gazi’s
poker table, this time sitting with the Shah of Persia and the
Prime Minister of Turkey Ismet Inönü. When the Ambassador
and the President were the last two on the draw, Atatürk leaned
over and exclaimed, “You see what our strength is when we are
playing against each other! Imagine what it would be if we were
92
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united!”19
Eventually, these nightlong marathons became part of
the living legend of Ambassador Loraine’s skillful tête-à-tête diplomacy on behalf of the British Crown, but the mystique tied
to these accounts does not diminish the real diplomatic efforts
to which they were inexorably tied. According to Ambassador
Loraine’s biographer, historian Gordon Waterfield, “Each evening one of the hotel clerks would send a list of those present
in the supper-room across to the President’s house at Cankaya,
and he would then make his way to the Hotel if there was anyone
he wanted to see.”20 One of President Atatürk’s modern biographers, historian Andrew Mango, observed:
The Gazi was the fount of new ideas and the arbiter of
disputes: careers were made and unmade round his table.
In one of his many stories about his parties, he ask[ed]
one of his guests, ‘Tell me what goes best with raki?’
‘Roasted chick peas (leblebi),’ the guest replie[d], knowing the host’s frugal tastes. ‘Wrong,’ [responded] Mustafa
Kemal, ‘the best accompaniment to raki is good conversation.’21
Such events offered Loraine an intimate platform to access the
President’s personal perspectives on the trajectory of Turkish
foreign policy. However, Atatürk represented only one side of
the Anglo-Turkish dialogue. Ambassador Loraine always acted
upon what he as a professional diplomat considered to be Britain’s best interests, but the Ambassador was also tied to the policy
directives of His Majesty’s Government, and, more specifically,
to the designs of the Secretary of State in London. Tensions
often arose between London and the British Embassy in Ankara
regarding what form the burgeoning Anglo-Turkish rapprochement should take. One such endeavor was to bring British economic policy up to speed in an attempt to overtake the privileged
(but waning) economic relationship harbored by the Soviets in
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the Turkish Republic in the early 1930s.
THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY
While Loraine was still posted in Cairo as British High
Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan between 1929 and 1933,
the Soviet Union orchestrated three high-level state visits with
Turkey that represented the zenith of Turco-Soviet cooperation
in the interwar period.22 Historian Samuel Hirst posits that the ties
between the two Black Sea neighbors encompassed much more
than just strong bilateral economic relations: the exchange of engineers, machinery, and long-term economic plans was matched
by parallel commitments to secularization and the development
of cultural ties, including musical and “cinematographic collaboration.”23 Alternatively, some historians frame the Turco-Soviet
understanding in terms of self-styled anti-Westernism grounded
in the two regional powers’ geo-historical relegation to the European periphery.24 Nevertheless, the most recognizable feature
of this relationship was Soviet economic assistance to the burgeoning Turkish Republic. For example, in 1932, the Soviets sold
eight million dollars in industrial equipment to Turkey with a
twenty-year interest-free repayment schedule.25 By the time Ambassador Loraine arrived to Turkey, the Turco-Soviet relationship had produced a Turco-Soviet Commercial Treaty in 1931,
bankrolled the first Turkish Five-Year Development Plan that
was implemented in April 1934, and provided funds to construct
textile mills at Kaygeri and Eregli in central Anatolia. Atatürk’s
new policy of state-led economic growth (etatism) prospered
with the support of the Soviet economy, which was one of the
few developing economies not to suffer deleterious shocks from
the World Economic Crisis in 1929-1930 (though the Soviet’s
socialist economy was well-beleaguered by 1934). However, the
Turkish economy was heavily lopsided, with the bulk of production remaining tied to agriculture. The industrial plan, revolving
around state-run holding companies such as Etibank (mining)
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and Sumerbank (manufacturing), only mobilized about 15% of
Turkish gross national product throughout the 1930s.26
Soviet economic support was waning by the end of 1934,
just as major geopolitical events turned Turkish eyes from the
Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Ultimately, the same forces
that lured Turkey away from the Soviet Union pushed the country toward Britain. As Hirst notes, an internal report from the
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dated May 28, 1935,
definitively cited that “divergent interpretations of international
politics threatened the [Turco-Soviet] partnership.”27 While the
Soviet Union assumed that Nazi Germany was the principal
threat to Europe, Turkey was more perturbed by its geopolitical
rival in the Mediterranean Basin: Fascist Italy.
However, while the geopolitics of Europe were pushing
the Turks toward the British, the etatist policies of Turkish Minister of Economics Celal Bayar frustrated British economists and
precluded any further agreements from being secured. By mid1934, Ambassador Loraine was immersed in telegrams to and
from Colonel Harold Woods in the Department of Overseas
Trade. British merchants were still operating under the AngloTurkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1930), but Turkey
began reneging on the agreement’s “most-favored nation” clause
to set quotas and to hike up tariffs on British imports. The impetus for these actions was Turkey’s negative balance of payments
with Britain. The Turkish government turned to a method of
economic manipulation to arrange clearing and compensation
agreements from its trading partners to create an “abnormal demand from clearing countries for Turkish produce in order to
free their frozen credits.”28 Because the British refused to acquiesce to Turkish pressures, British merchants were excluded from
Turkish government contracts. “The outlook for the future is
not encouraging,” wrote Loraine in the British Embassy’s Annual Report on Turkey for 1934.29 Therefore, one of Loraine’s
principal duties was to find a way to liberalize trade with the
Turks without having to sign a humiliating clearing agreement.30
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In March 1934, Ambassador Loraine invoked the possibility of manipulating the British Mandate of Palestine for additional leverage on the Turkish economy: “The present position is that Palestine is buying £1,000,000 worth of stuff from
Turkey and is selling here about £40,000 worth”—amounting a
significant trade imbalance that, if ameliorated, could right the
scales of Turkish commercial policy to make way for more British exports.31 Loraine qualified his strategy to the Board of Trade
in London, warning, “We had better be cautious about waving
big sticks at the Turks,” and suggesting, “We had better keep the
possible Palestine card up [our] sleeve.”32
Only a few months into his diplomatic tenure in Turkey,
Loraine was already digesting Turkish public opinion and deflating the tensions that struck discord between Ankara and London. “They are not being malicious about it but are overwhelmingly impressed with the necessity of protecting their interests,”
the Ambassador wrote.33 Eventually, between Loraine’s diplomatic efforts and the work of Colonel Woods in London, Britain
signed a Trade and Payments Agreement with Turkey over a year
later in June 1935, though the eventual agreement (replete with
tariff concessions) was constructed heavily in Turkey’s favor and
was largely regarded as a “sacrifice” made by Britain to win favor
in the Turkish Republic for increased diplomatic cooperation.34
Clearly, further economic engagement proved to be the anticipated “sign of support” President Atatürk had beseeched from
the Ambassador over their game of cards in June 1934; a year
afterward, Loraine finally delivered the goods.
Loraine’s Annual Report on Turkey for 1934 offers
an overview of British perspectives on Turkish foreign policy
substantiating the sliver of opportunity for Anglo-Turkish rapprochement. Ambassador Loraine remarked specifically on Turkey’s “decided coolness toward Italy,” “longstanding and tried
friendship with Russia,” “mutual commercial advantage” with
Nazi Germany, and unmistakable “increase in friendliness” with
Britain.35 Nonetheless, Turkish relations with His Majesty’s Gov96
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ernment remained stricken by both countries’ frustrating commercial policies; the “unfortunate” shooting incident of a British
naval offer; and the looming nationalization of the Anglo-French
Constantinople Quay Company that plagued economic relations
throughout much of the 1930s. Part of the debate regarding the
Constantinople Quay Company was a fissure between the Bank
of England and the British Treasury. According to Turkish historian Mika Suonpää, “The Bank [of England] unsuccessfully
opposed all commercial agreements with Turkey, and its officials
used the problems created by the Quays Company’s nationalization, Turkish economic policy more widely, and the country’s
dismal debt history to argue that Britain should not pursue closer
financial ties with Turkey.”36
Nonetheless, politicians in London remained interested
in building closer political ties with Turkey, therefore generally ignoring the concerns expressed by the Bank of England.
His Majesty’s Government used political loans (i.e. commercial
agreements and export credits) as “part of the strategy securing
Turkey’s collaboration in maintaining the military and political
stability in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and beyond.”37
Britain was still far removed from this reality by the end of 1934,
but Ambassador Loraine was committed to seeing this relationship develop further. He watched a fresh snowfall blanket Ankara on New Year’s Day of 1935. A little over a week later, Loraine was bound for Istanbul on a warmed train, crossing the
Anatolian highlands in pursuit of the latest news from London.
SEARCHING FOR A MEDITERRANEAN RESPONSE
Turkey’s diplomatic service was alert to the growing reality of Italian militarism. Turkish historian Dilek Barlas provides
the translation of a Turkish Foreign Ministry document from
October 1934, which warned of impending Italian military action in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) “as soon as favorable domestic and
international conditions emerged.”38 Loraine was more skeptiPenn History Review
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cal of Mussolini’s territorial ambitions in Africa, contending,
“The Turks habitually exaggerated this danger.”39 Still, in spite
of Ambassador Loraine’s protestations, the death of five Italian askaris (colonial soldiers) in the contested Walwal region in
eastern Abyssinia prompted retaliation from Rome on February
10, 1935. Mussolini mobilized two Italian divisions and ordered
an increased military build-up in the surrounding Italian colonies
of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland—a blatant threat to the sovereignty of Abyssinia and the maintenance of the status quo in the
region.
It was in 1935 that Anglo-Turkish relations began to pick
up steam in response to the changing geopolitical landscape in
the Eastern Mediterranean and the increasing importance of
the League of Nations in stymieing Italian aggression. At the
same time, Ambassador Loraine’s foresight was muddled by the
dual track diplomacy unfolding in Geneva and Ankara. Foreign
Minister Dr. Aras was in Geneva negotiating sanctions to be
imposed on the Italians over the crisis in Abyssinia, arbitrating
alongside Sir Samuel Hoare and Anthony Eden, both of whom
served as Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in late
1935. Ambassador Loraine complained to London in December about this divergence: “Would it be possible to improve
and speed up the machinery for keeping British representatives
abroad informed of what passes at Geneva[?]…What concerns
me is the time lag.”40 The British Ambassador was acting in a
precarious, time-sensitive environment. The most recent information from the League of Nations was critical to maintaining
the British position in Ankara. Though the Turks wished for an
inclusive Mediterranean security arrangement with the British
Navy as its keystone, President Atatürk was also using Italian
aggression to call for the remilitarization of the Turkish Straits—
this time with increased tact due to the direct threat of Italian refortification of the Dodecanese Islands off the coast of western
Anatolia. His Majesty’s Government adamantly opposed Turkish
remilitarization of the Straits—still dictated by the disarmament
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clauses within the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and of Locarno
(1925)— thus placing the British in an uncomfortable position:
Britain was interested in tightening relations with the Turks, but
preferred not to yield to Atatürk’s primary request.41 Loraine was
caught between these two forces, charged with spanning the gap
that fluctuated between official and unofficial opinion in London
and Ankara.
On November 25, 1935, Ambassador Loraine spoke with
the Turkish Foreign Minister about the possibilities of AngloTurkish rapprochement, and sent an evaluation of the responses
of Dr. Aras to Secretary Hoare in London:
Turkey’s interests in the Mediterranean are as identical as
they could possibly be with those of the United Kingdom; that any diminution of British naval influence in
the Mediterranean would be a calamity for Turkey; that
any Mediterranean settlement which did not take Turkish
interests into account would be viewed by Turkey with
alarm and dismay; that Turkey looks to the United Kingdom as the only possibly effective champion of peace
and security in the Mediterranean, and hencethereforth
[sic] of Turkish national security interests in those waters;
that the most disastrous result for Turkey would be the
conversion of the Mediterranean into a Latin lake; that
Turkey in this matter, in view of the convincing proofs
she has given of her entirely pacific and peace-making
policies, is justified in looking to the United Kingdom to
safeguard her interests in the Mediterranean, convinced
that the United Kingdom in doing so will be serving her
own wider interests no less well than those of Turkey,
however minor her interests may appear by comparison
with ours.42
Dr. Aras made it clear to Loraine that Turkish opinion strongly
favored an immediate resolution of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis,
Penn History Review
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followed by a Mediterranean security pact. However, as Turkish
historian Dilek Barlas notes, “Britain alone could not restrain the
ever-growing Italian power and threat to the region.”43 Instead,
Turkey called for an inclusive five-power pact, which included
France, Britain, Greece, Italy, and Turkey, to provide for the stability of the entire Mediterranean. This proposition was thwarted quickly by disagreements among all of the powers involved.
In particular, France and Britain were “reluctant to assume such
roles in the Mediterranean” once news of Nazi Germany’s rearmament spread across Western Europe in 1935. Still, the Turks
remained convinced that pulling Italy into a wide coalition would
prove more effective than simply balancing Italian aggression
vis-à-vis an alliance with another great power—namely Britain.44
Turkey was not yet willing to abandon the hope of a multilateral agreement, and Britain was not yet willing to give Ankara
the assurances that some, including Loraine, thought the Turks
deserved. This was the geostrategic impasse on which questions
of the Turkish Straits became more divisive in 1936. For the
time being, as Ambassador Loraine noted in his Annual Report
on Turkey for 1935, “In view of the increasing gravity of the
dispute between Italy and the League of Nations, and of the
ensuing friendly collaboration of His Majesty’s Government and
Turkey, the Turkish Government, without abandoning their purpose, were content to let the question of the Straits sleep until a
more propitious day should dawn.”45
Italian mobilization in Abyssinia and the construction of
airfields on the Dodecanese Islands motivated the Turks to reevaluate their own navy and air force in 1935. In April, Dr. Aras
stressed Turkey’s drastic need for an updated surface navy: “It
[is] the fleet…which in the last resort decide[s] wars…on sea a
fleet [has] the last word.”46 While the British were enthusiastic
toward a naval counterweight to Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean, they also had an international reputation to uphold as the
“champions of world wide disarmament.”47 Therefore, Britain
was forced to tread a thin and hypocritical line governing Tur100
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key’s rearmament that would not go so far as to invoke questions
of remilitarizing the Straits. Barlas and fellow Turkish historian
Serhat Güvenç draw attention to a British Foreign Office document from November 1934 that expressed concern that “The
prospect of a race between Italy and her nervous little neighbors
conducted on borrowed money [would be] a nightmare.”48
Turkey, looking to buy naval armaments from the lowest
bidder, signed a contract with Nazi Germany to buy four submarines between 1936 and 1937.49 Britain was already alarmed by
Nazi Germany’s large economic foothold in Turkey, and politicians in London moved swiftly to keep Turkey out of Hitler’s
orbit, a strategy that was billed as a geostrategic check to Nazi
German encroachment in the vulnerable Balkan Peninsula.50 To
prevent Nazi Germany’s strong economic ties with Turkey from
turning into direct political influence, the British Admiralty increased its sensitivities for the Turkish Navy, exchanging fleet
inspections and synchronizing naval cooperation over the ensuing years.
The British Government’s attempts to bolster the Turkish
Air Force were also impeded by strained economic relations. By
mistake, the Turkish General Staff learned that Britain recently
had sold a number of warplanes to Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the
Turks wished to issue an order for themselves. However, when
the Turkish General Staff requested to buy one million pounds
in British aircraft, commercial negotiations once again undermined the transaction and both parties were forced to settle for a
reduced number of aircraft that satisfied the conservative agenda
of the bankers in London.51 Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in
1935 was thus still held back by the lethargy of British commercial policy. Britain was not interested in increasing trade with
Turkey—British firms could buy cheaper raw materials from
British colonies abroad—and London’s policy of maintaining a
favorable balance of trade was rejected outright by the Turkish
government. Thus, even in terms of geopolitical security, Britain
“could not put the rapprochement between the two countries
Penn History Review
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onto sound economic foundations,” a fact that shouldered even
more responsibility onto Ambassador Loraine.52
What Loraine did manage to accomplish in 1935 was the
realization of an informal multilateral Mediterranean security
pact that worked both in and around the League of Nations.
The alliance grouped Britain, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia together in a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that imposed sanctions on
Italy via the League of Nations’ Committee of Eighteen, guaranteeing each other mutual support in the case of further Italian aggression.53 The Italian Ambassador to Turkey was alarmed
by Turkey’s blatant alignment with Britain and outwardly criticized this reactionary measure. The Turkish Foreign Ministry
responded by making clear that Turkey was simply obliging its
commitments to the League of Nations, “which were no secret
at all.”54 Fortuitously, the French acquiesced to the British-led security agreement in the Mediterranean, and with the conclusion
of the Franco-Soviet Pact, in addition to the extension of the
Turco-Soviet Protocol in 1935, Turkey’s strategic defense was
secured within a constellation of advantageous relationships.
Admittedly, the weakness within this multilateral “Gentlemen’s
Agreement” was the attitude of France and Britain toward Italy.
The Great Powers still hoped to divert a potential conflict by
appeasing Mussolini and deflating Italian revisionism through
diplomatic engagement. The tension between an explicit Mediterranean Pact that targeted Italy (the Turkish position) and an
implicit understanding that would include Italy in maintaining
the status quo (the British position) was a crucial consideration
in the development of Anglo-Turkish relations.
Therefore, by the end of 1935, Britain was facing a strategic impasse highlighted by the divergent directives coming out
of London. The Foreign Office reflected the gloomy views of
Secretary Eden and his advisors, mainly “that [Mussolini] would
be compelled to launch fresh adventures and end [up] as Hitler’s satellite.55 These attitudes were doubly opposed by Britain’s
conservative press and military, which held that Mussolini would
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“soon revert to his former role of ‘good European.’”56 Therefore, while the Foreign Office continued to pursue an alliance
bloc—advocating defensive agreements with Greece and Turkey—the joint command of the British military was reluctant
to acknowledge any action that might alienate Rome. Admiral
Ernle Chatfield argued that Britain’s support of sanctions from
the League of Nations and London’s trust in collective security
“have got us into this quarrel with Italy,” putting undue stress
on Britain’s imperial responsibilities, which was an “intolerable
strain on the navy’s resources and [an] unacceptable risk of
war.”57 Historian Reynolds Salerno provides that “Britain’s lack
of adequate naval bases and weak military strength in the eastern
Mediterranean would require the British to be on the defensive
if Italy became hostile, regardless of the number of British allies
there.”58
Britain’s tender relations with Italy were compounded by

Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (left), His Majesty
King Edward VIII of the United Kingdom (center), and
British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine (right) meet aboard
Atatürk’s personal yacht in Istanbul, Turkey,
on September 5, 1936.
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two maxims of strategic thinking. First, His Majesty’s Government took for granted that a hostile Italy made a general European war more likely and dangerous. Second, British imperial defense doctrine specified three major geostrategic commitments:
“the defense of the Far East, the defense of India, and obligations in Western Europe arising from the Locarno Pact.”59 An
aggressive Italy subverted Britain’s strategic unity. By extending
influence into the Eastern Mediterranean as far as the Dodecanese Islands, Italy could simultaneously threaten the Suez Canal
in Egypt; jeopardize British land and air routes to the Indian
Raj (through Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq); destabilize the Balkan
Peninsula by supporting Bulgarian revanchism and Nazi German designs on Southeastern Europe; and—in the event of
Japanese pugnacity in the Far East—unbalance the distribution
of the British naval fleet by prompting a “stab in the back from
Mussolini” if Britain deployed its forces elsewhere.60 First Lord
of the Admiralty Winston Churchill was one of the few British
statesmen to understand the threats posed in Southeastern Europe. He maintained that Britain and France must bring Turkey
into the war to support Romania in the Balkan Peninsula, gain
control of the Black Sea, and seal the Mediterranean Basin to
prevent the Nazis from “solv[ing] their problems of food and oil
supply and thus to defeat the Allies’ long-war strategy.”61
While Winston Churchill articulated this opinion in 1939
in the face of war, the strategic calculus of the British navy in
the Eastern Mediterranean can be traced back to the origins of
Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in 1934-1935. Keeping this approach in mind, it is no coincidence that Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan would
identify Turkey as the “lynch-pin” of the entire Eastern Mediterranean.62 With Fascist Italy orchestrating espionage campaigns in
Morocco and Malta, riling Macedonian and Croat nationalism in
Yugoslavia, subsidizing and producing anti-British propaganda
in Egypt and Palestine, amassing a sizable military force in Libya,
and claiming Mussolini as the “Protector of Islam” in the Middle
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East, a pro-British Turkish Republic was vital to stymie the score
of Italian hostilities across the Mediterranean Basin.63 Nevertheless, as the calendar turned from 1935 to 1936, Ambassador Loraine was still struggling with the Foreign Office to see eye-toeye with the Turks in Ankara, particularly over the disagreements
at the League of Nations in Geneva concerning the status of the
Turkish Straits in the face of the burgeoning threat to peace on
the European continent.
IMPLICATIONS OF ANGLO-TURKISH
RAPPROCHEMENT
At a dinner party in the summer of 1937, Loraine imparted to his guests: “The duty of the diplomat is not so much
to avert war at any price, as to ensure that, if war is inevitable, his
country will at least have the right allies. It takes many years of
persevering peace-time effort to accomplish as much.”64 Keeping the Ambassador’s judicious words in mind, the study of diplomatic history during peacetime can be just as illuminating as
the study of diplomatic discontinuities during times of war. The
story of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement contains both. While
Turkey tried to entrench Anglo-Turkish relations in an explicit
multilateral Mediterranean Pact multiple times between 1934
and 1939, Britain hoped that an implicit understanding of their
advantageous relationship would give British (and Turkish) policymakers more flexibility to pursue divergent diplomatic goals
while fostering stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The British thus delayed the signing of any substantial written agreement
with Turkey, preferring to appease the Italians and the Nazis instead. The British strategy of appeasement in the Mediterranean
Basin finally fell apart in the face of Italy’s invasion of Albania in
April 1939. Therefore, by the time of the signing of the AngloFrench-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance in October 1939,
the European state system had already begun to unravel past the
point of no return. The explicit multilateral security pact Turkey
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sought out in 1935 was useless by 1939, and the Turkish Republic had no other choice but to declare neutrality during the
Second World War (1939-1945).
Before 1939, an alliance with Turkey provided Britain a
key agent in Southeastern Europe, theoretically making it possible to deter and protect the Balkan Peninsula from Italian and
Nazi German aggression. Some scholars have admonished Britain and the other Western Allied Powers—including France and
the United States of America—for the ‘abandonment’ and ‘betrayal’ of Southern and Eastern Europe, not at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, but earlier at the Munich Conference in
September 1938, shaming the Allied Powers for turning away
from the small nations of Europe.65 However, such an assessment is more complicated if one evaluates the Anglo-Turkish
Mutual Aid Agreement of May 12, 1938 as a defensive corollary for the region that established an Anglo-Turkish bulwark in
the Balkan Peninsula months before the Munich Agreement was
signed on September 30, 1938. Given the enthusiastic rhetoric
of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement on both sides, and London’s
surprise at Ankara’s decision to shrink before its treaty duties in
1939, it can be argued that Britain invested real strategic value in
Turkey as a guarantor of Allied security in the Balkan Peninsula,
both before and after the Munich Conference.
Without completely turning toward counterfactual history, the fate of Southeastern Europe may not have been sealed
at the Munich Conference in September 1938, but, in actuality,
signed away in Moscow with the German-Soviet (Molotov-Ribbentrop) Non-aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. The Soviet
‘betrayal’ of the Allied Powers did not just erase Poland from the
map: the agreement effectively compromised Turkey’s eastern
flank and undermined the country’s ability to act freely in alignment with Britain and France. When the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact was exposed, Britain’s most important ally in the region—
the Turkish Republic—was geopolitically compromised and subsequently pressured to bow out of the Anglo-French-Turkish
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His Majesty King Edward VIII of the United Kingdom
(center left) alongside Turkish President Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk (center right) in Istanbul in 1936. Their first meeting was orchestrated by British Ambassador Sir Percy
Loraine, indicating the success of Anglo-Turkish
rapprochement.

Treaty of 1939 and retire into neutrality in 1940. Returning to
the details of Loraine’s game of cards on June 17, 1934, the span
of Anglo-Turkish relations was augured by President Atatürk’s
assessment that Turkey would maintain “open and parallel…
friendships” with Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain’s bet on
the Turkish Republic in 1934 was spoiled by the Soviets’ gamble
on Nazi Germany in 1939.
Therefore, Turkey’s role in Britain’s grand strategy should
not be discounted, especially in terms of the decision for further
appeasement at the Munich Conference of 1938. The wishful
thinking driving Anglo-Turkish rapprochement permeated the
Allied Powers’ grand strategy, and the mythos of the ‘abandonment’ and ‘betrayal’ of the small nations of Europe should be
measured against Britain’s reliance on Turkey’s cooperation and
influence (including the Turkish Republic’s shared “views, interests, and principles”) in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern
Mediterranean between the inception of Anglo-Turkish rapPenn History Review
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prochement in 1934 and its subsequent collapse in 1939-1940.66
Later, Loraine reflected on the legacy of his diplomatic mission
in Turkey:
[If the observer needed] any proof…of the efficacy of
the British lines of policy…shall we not find it in the fact
that the Turkish Republic, many of whose men fought
against us in the last war, is now our friend and ally and
has kept, at enormous sacrifice to the nation, an army
of one million men mobilized for three years to oppose
any aggression on her sovereignty, her territory and her
liberty.67
In hindsight, Anglo-Turkish rapprochement was a diplomatic achievement. Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine succeeded
in turning a historical enemy into a benevolent bystander, due in
part to what esteemed British diplomat Sir Pierson Dixon called,
“the excellence of [Ambassador Loraine’s] judgment—[which]
might better be called the rarest of all qualities: wisdom.”68 As
one of Loraine’s dinner guests in the summer of 1937 exclaimed,
“If the pendulum [of Turkish policy] was now swinging over
to friendship with Great Britain, it was because the unremitting
efforts of the Ambassador had set it in motion.”69 Nonetheless,
the momentum of Loraine’s lauded tenure in the Turkish capital
could not keep Turkey from folding in the face of war; for alongside Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, like in any game of poker or
diplomacy, there were always other hands in play.
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